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PREVENTIVE DETENTION: DANGEROUS
UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT
Protecting the innocent, even at the expense of freeing the guilty, is a principle grounded in early American jurisprudence.' This foundational tenet
reflects the belief that wrongful detention threatens violence to civil order
that is worse than the violence detention rightfully seeks to prevent.2 The
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution uphold
this principle by ensuring that no person will be deprived of liberty without
"due process of law." 3 The constitutional proscription against excessive
bail4 and the guarantee of an early trial complement the right to due
process. 5
These fundamental protections, however, have not forestalled the need for
clear-cut legislation to define the terms by which a person may be detained
prior to conviction. 6 Positive law governing bail determinations does not
answer the question of "how much" bail is necessary. Instead, the question
is when may the court deny bail outright. 7 General agreement exists that
criminal charges for certain capital offenses, such as murder, may require
outright denial of bail to prevent the accused's flight from the jurisdiction.'
1. J. KUNEN, How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? Foreword (1985) ("We find, in
the rules laid down by the greatest English Judges, who have been the brightest of mankind,
[that] we are to look upon it as more beneficial, that many guilty persons should escape unpunished, than one innocent person should suffer." (quoting 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
242 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965))).
2. Id.
3. The fifth amendment states: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment further provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 7 (F. Inbau, J. Thompson & A. Moenssens
3d ed. 1983) (state courts are constrained by various statutes to try the accused within a specified time or release him with full immunity from further prosecution); cf Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (trial must commence within 70 days of indictment or first judicial appearance, except in specified instances).
7. See infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91 ("And upon all arrests in
criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death, in which
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Furthermore, courts may deny bail when the accused threatens the safety of
witnesses.9 Much less settled, however, is the propriety of detention not
borne out of concern that the accused may forfeit his surety and flee,' 0 but
rather that bond set at any amount will not protect the community from the
threat of future harm that the accused's release poses."
General public dissatisfaction with the bail-bond system in the District of
Columbia' 2 spurred Congress, in 1970, to enact an amendment to the District of Columbia Code allowing detention without bond of defendants
charged with certain "dangerous crimes" where "no condition or combination of conditions . ..will reasonably assure [the] safety of the community." 13 The District of Columbia statute, in turn, served as the eventual
model for the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Bail Reform Act), 14 establishing the
predetermination of dangerousness as a ground for detention at the federal
level.' 5 In United States v. Salerno,16 the United States Supreme Court confirmed the constitutional soundness of the threat-to-the-community standard'" and supplied a much-needed "regulatory" response to the growing

bail crisis.' 8
Danger, as an element of the government's decision to detain an individual, is not generally limited to the bail-bond system.' 9 In a companion decicases it shall not be admitted" except in the discretion of a judge, justice, or court of the United
States.); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(1).
9. United States v. Payden, 768 F.2d 487, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing the inherent power of courts prior to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to protect witnesses before trial by
detaining defendants who threaten their personal safety); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(b) (Supp. III
1985) (providing for a judicial hearing to determine detention in cases involving persons who
pose a serious threat to the safety of a prospective witness or juror).
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1986) (dangerous

persons left to remain at liberty impose risks, but society may not deprive them of the guarantee of liberty in an arbitrary manner).
12. See generally Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 1965, at A12, col. 2 (illustrating the failure, before
bail reform, of the District of Columbia's bail-bond system to curtail violent crimes committed
by individuals released prior to trial).
13. Pub. L. No.91-358, 84 Stat. 639, 644 (currently codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 231322(a)(1) (1981)).
14. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 31413143 (Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter Bail Reform Act].
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); see also infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
16. 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987).
17. Id. at 2098 (upholding the facial validity of the Bail Reform Act).
18. The majority in United States v. Salerno maintained that preventive detention under

the Bail Reform Act is permissible "regulation" and is not "punishment" for dangerous behavior. Id. at 2101-02. The distinction developed from congressional intent and from the existence of a rational regulatory purpose for detention which, in the alternative, might otherwise
be deemed punishment without due process. Id.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 224-29.
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sion to Salerno, the Supreme Court held in Hilton v. Braunskill,2 ° that
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 23, sections (c) and (d),2 1 provide federal courts with the authority to stay the enlargement of a successful habeas
corpus petition where the presumption of release is overcome by a showing
of dangerousness to the public.2 2
Unlike the standards for detention following bail proceedings, 23 stay of
habeas relief pending appeal relies on traditional standards governing the
stay of civil judgments.2 4 Where the Bail Reform Act affords an adversarial
hearing to allow the accused an opportunity to rebut the presumption that
no conditions of release will ensure the safety of the community, 25 rule 23(c)
creates a presumption favoring the habeas petitioner's release. 26 The prosecutor may overcome the presumption, however, if the traditional stay factors
are shown. 7
This Comment will examine the competing doctrines of detention established by Salerno and Hilton and explore, more generally, judicial authority,
within the confines of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, to predict dangerous behavior. Inherent inconsistencies exist between methods used to determine the dangerousness of successful habeas petitioners and those
methods used to assess whether individuals should be incarcerated prior to
trial. Whether the system of presumptions and challenges in either situation
affords complete assurance that only the dangerous and guilty will be detained while the innocent go free, is, at best, highly debatable. It is fundamental, therefore, that our criminal justice system provide more clear-cut
20. 107 S. Ct. 2113 (1987).
21. FED. R. App. P. 23(c) directs a court, justice, or judge to order release of a successful
habeas petitioner pending review of the decision unless the deciding court or a higher court
"shall otherwise order." FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(d) specifies that the initial release or custody
order shall control review of the decision unless modification or an independent order is warranted for "special reasons." Cf infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
22. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2117-19 & n.4. Federal prisoners having cause to appeal their
convictions on the ground of wrongful imprisonment may seek a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release. The prosecutor may rebut the presumption favoring enlargement of a successful habeas petitioner with a persuasive showing of dangerousness, without challenge by
adversarial proceeding, to justify detention of the petitioner pending appeal. Cf 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e) (a presumption favoring detention may be rebutted by the defendant during an adversarial hearing).
23. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
24. The standards governing the issuance of a stay of civil judgments are: "(1) whether
the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay
will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
interest lies." Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2119; see also infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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determinants to be used to predict dangerous behavior. The likelihood that
the dangerous but innocent might be detained also exists and raises the question of whether this result, albeit favorable to public safety even for a short
period, is an acceptable refinement of our nation's desire to protect the
innocent.
I.

A.

THE BOUNDS OF "CIVIL"

PREVENTION

A Brief History of Preventive Detention

Historically, courts have applied preventive detention exclusively in civil
proceedings.2" While the power to prosecute a criminal offense may result in
civil detention prior to trial, 29 it is the power to bring an individual into
custody which forms the basis for detention.3" Determining what makes a
person in custody "dangerous" enough to justify detention without trial involves the interplay of administrative necessity and predictive psychological
judgments.3" In the past, Congress has frequently resorted to legislative enactment to authorize custody and detention of individuals who, because of
their mental state or other factors, pose a threat to the community.3 2 For
instance, while wholesale prevention based on racial ancestry has survived
rigid judicial scrutiny, 33 courts generally have upheld detention where such
action is "necessary and proper" to the exercise of some specific federal
28. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2102 (1987) (reviewing the instances where
courts have held that detention as a means of protecting community safety serves a compelling
regulatory interest); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42 (1952) (administrative
detention of communist aliens prior to deportation proceedings does not warrant judicial review where party doctrine advocating violent revolution threatens public safety).
29. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 109 (3d Cir.) (location of preventive detention
provisions in the United States Code title dealing with crimes does not change the fact that
detention remains a civil commitment procedure), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986).
30. Once in the custody and care of the United States, individuals accused of federal offenses but found mentally incompetent to stand trial remain subject to the purview of the
federal courts to initiate commitment proceedings. See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S.
366, 375 (1956). While it is the prosecutor's duty to bring a case before the court, prolonged
detention of individuals brought into custody requires a judicial determination of probable
cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (prosecutor's information alone found
insufficient to support detention beyond steps incident to warrantless arrest).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 228-31, 244-50.
32. See infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
33. At the outbreak of World War II, the Defense Department initiated a program of
detention, curfew, and exclusion against persons of Japanese ancestry. See Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (unanimously upholding military authority to impose curfew
restrictions on Japanese-Americans). While the United States Supreme Court never decided
the constitutionality of detention under the relocation program, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,
297 (1944) (invalidating detention of Japanese-Americans for lack of statutory authority), the
Court upheld exclusion of such persons from military areas to prevent sabotage. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny test and upholding
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authority.34
In the midst of Cold War concern for domestic security against the threat
of communism, Congress has found the authority within its plenary powers
to detain communist aliens prior to deportation proceedings.3 5

The

Supreme Court, in Carlson v. Landon,36 specifically rejected fifth and eighth
amendment challenges to the United States Attorney General's authority to
detain aliens without bond in such instances.3 7 Under the statutory scheme,
hearsay evidence, without benefit of rebuttal through an adversarial hearing,
sufficed to determine that an individual was an active alien Communist and
hence detainable as a public menace. 3 8 Because deportation is not a criminal
proceeding, but rather a civil proceeding,39 the Carlson majority found detention "necessarily" a part of the deportation procedure and therefore consistent with due process." The Court interpreted the delegation of
discretionary authority to the Attorney General to act as judge and jailor as
necessary in light of the steady, post-war influx of aliens into the country.41
The Carlson Court accepted a narrow view of the eighth amendment, finding that no absolute right to bail exists.42 Drawing from a now popular
defendant's conviction for violating military order to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry
from designated military area).
34. Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 375 (upholding legislative authority "auxiliary to incontestable national power"); see, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (detention "necessarily" a part of deportation).
35. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534, 538.
36. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
37. Id. at 542, 546. The district court in Carlson detained the petitioners without bail
under a congressional grant of authority to the United States Attorney General to deport all
alien communists. Based on findings that communist teachings advocate violent overthrow of
democratic nations, the Court ruled the Constitution vested the Executive with discretionary
power to seek out and deport all Communist Party members. Id. at 528-31. In affirming the
constitutionality of the legislative scheme, the Supreme Court held that, where the legislative
standard for deportation is "clear and definite" and the refusal of bail is not "arbitrary or
capricious," the Executive's exercise of discretionary judgment to detain Communist Party
members does not violate due process. Id. at 543-47. Because the English Bill of Rights, the
source of the bail provisions in the United States Constitution, accorded not an absolute right
to bail but only a prohibition against excessive bail, congressional action to deny bail to certain
classes of cases does not violate the eighth amendment. Id. at 544-46; see also infra note 43
and accompanying text.
38. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 552-56 (Black, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 537.
40. Id. at 538. Where temporary confinement necessary as an administrative step toward
deportation involves hard labor or other "infamous punishments," however, due process requires the full protections of a jury trial. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238
(1896).
41. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 543 n.39.
42. Id. at 545-46.
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Act of 1689, 4 3 the majority deterthat bail not be excessive in cases
Contrary arguments recognize the
of bail but enforcing a proscription

against excessive bail, when the result in either case is pretrial imprisonment. 45 Detractors note, moreover, that reading the bail clause as a restraint
on judicial excess contradicts accepted notions that the Bill of Rights intended to limit only the power of Congress. 4
During the same term as the Carlson decision, the Supreme Court, in
Stack v. Boyle,47 considered the bail issue in the context of criminal proceedings.4 8 The Stack Court acknowledged that an unequivocal right to bail in
noncapital offenses was necessary to the right to be free from "punishment"
prior to trial. 49 Freedom prior to conviction ensured the accused unre-

strained preparation of a defense.5 ° In such a case, bail functions primarily
to protect against failure to appear at trial."'
Like Carlson, the Stack decision construed antisedition legislation
designed to root out communist influences.52 Unlike the Internal Security
43. 1 W. & M. 2, ch. 2, § 1(10). The Court in Carlson stated:
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from [the] English Bill of Rights Act.
In England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases,
but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper
to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was
said that indicated any different concept. The Eighth Amendment has not prevented
Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this
country. Thus in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be
death. Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be
bailable.
342 U.S. at 545-46 (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2105
(1987). But see Carlson, 342 U.S. at 557 (Black, J., dissenting) (United States Bill of Rights
"adopted to guarantee Americans greater freedom than had been enjoyed by their ancestors
who had been driven from Europe by persecution."); see also United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d
100, 110 (3d Cir.) (treating Carlson as having limited application in state criminal cases due to
the exclusive province of the federal government to detain aliens pending deportation), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986).
44. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 544-46.
45. See id. at 556-58 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Under this contention, the Eighth Amendment is a limitation upon judges only, for while a judge cannot constitutionally fix excessive
bail, Congress can direct that people be held in jail without any right to bail at all.").
46. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (crim. prac. series) § 12.3, at 133
(1984).
47. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. The petitioners in Stack were charged with violating the Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat.
670 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982)), which made conspiracy to under-
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Act 5 3 applied in Carlson, the Smith Act54 in Stack provided for criminal
penalties and did not rely on a presumption of dangerousness incident to

deportation as grounds for detention. 55 The Stack majority, in fact, expressly denounced treating an indictment as grounds for excessive bail, finding it disturbingly reminiscent of the totalitarian principles that the Smith

Act sought to prevent. 56 In Salerno, this punitive/regulatory dichotomy became crucial to the bail issue because, in an administrative setting where
detention did not carry the mantle of "punishment," surety was not
necessary.57

The moral dilemma peacetime detention raises in a democracy disappears
when exigencies of civil insurrection or war make it necessary to detain an
individual. 5" A miner's strike in the 1900's resulting in domestic violence
and subsequent detention of strikers by the Governor of Colorado, led the
Supreme Court to address the due process complaint in Moyer v. Peabody..59
The Supreme Court, taking judicial notice of the pliancy with which due
process attaches in varying circumstances, 6 upheld the power of the state to
head off mob violence by whatever means necessary, including deadly
force.61

One of the oldest and most unrestrained grants of detention authority derives from the power granted by the fifth Congress to the executive branch to
deal with the exigencies of war.62 Where citizens of hostile nations reside
take acts to overthrow the government a criminal offense. 342 U.S. at 3. The Carlson petitioners were arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, and 50 U.S.C.), which granted the Attorney General the authority to detain without bail, prior to deportation, any aliens found to be
members of the Communist Party. 342 U.S. at 526-27 & n.4.
53. ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 984.
54. ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
55. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (court must set bail to ensure defendants' appearance at trial
where a final conviction carries a criminal penalty of five years imprisonment and a fine of up
to $10,000); cf 342 U.S. at 528 n.5 (continued custody pending final determination of deportation at the discretion of the Attorney General).
56. 342 U.S. at 6.
57. 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987) (detention without bail not punishment where legislative
intent evinces careful plan for "regulating" a pressing societal problem).
58. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 83 (1909) (detention resulting from state governor's declaration that a state of insurrection exists is a conclusion of fact not subject to judicial
review); see also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 161-62 (1948) (President has congressional
mandate to direct the manner of restraint used against foreign nationals during times of war).
59. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
60. Id. at 84 (due process of law varies with the circumstances and subject matter).
61. Id. (supplement to Colorado Constitution empowering the governor to act to repel
insurrection includes orders to kill where necessary).
62. Enemy Alien Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577.
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within the United States, the Enemy Alien Act of 179863 grants to the President unconditional authority to detain and deport such individuals.6 The
Supreme Court decision in Ludecke v. Watkins 65 affirmed this power where
the Court held the government had lawfully detained a German national
awaiting deportation during World War 11.66
In both Moyer and Ludecke, a statute empowered a government official to
use preventive detention upon finding an individual dangerous.6 7 The Court
presumed the United States official's decision lawful in both cases.68
The quick decisions required of government authorities facing civil unrest,
likened by the Moyer Court to those made by a captain of a ship at sea,6 9
require no clearer standard of proof than "good faith" judgment that the
person detained stands in the way of a return to order.70 This standard
sharply contrasts with the standard of proof required to involuntarily commit a person to a mental hospital.7" The Supreme Court in Addington v.
Texas 72 determined that, in such a case, due process demands "clear and
convincing evidence."a7 The Addington Court noted that while the choice of
the proper standard of proof to apply in any judicial proceeding, civil or
criminal, may be largely academic where the nuances are lost to a jury,7 4 the
need for some workable threshold of proof increases as the interest at stake
becomes more substantial. 5 Civil commitment, like a criminal conviction
where proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the standard,7 6 potentially involves a significant deprivation of liberty.77 Addington taught, however, that
due process warrants a lesser standard of proof in proceedings to involuntarily commit the mentally ill because reliance on psychiatric diagnosis, not
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 161-62 (1948).
65. 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
66. Id. at 162-63.
67. See cases cited supra note 58.
68. Id.; see also Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 163-66 (executive power to deport during times of
war is not reviewable); cf id. at 184-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (contending deportation hearing required to comport with due process, but supporting the principle that the "needs of the
hour may well require summary apprehension and detention of alien enemies" during
wartime).
69. 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909).
70. Id. (governor not liable for "good faith" arrests made to prevent insurrection).
71. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (rejecting as too subjective state
application of beyond a reasonable doubt standard in cases of persons involuntarily committed
to mental hospitals).
72. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
73. Id. at 433.
74. Id. at 424-25.
75. Id. at 423-24.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 425.
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clear discernible facts, is at issue."' The Court did not address the troubling
notion that the admittedly vague science of determining mental illness79
might result in wrongful detention, yet the Court evinced great concern that
an unrealistically high standard of proof would prevent the seriously ill from
receiving psychiatric treatment.8 0
In the federal criminal system, a range of statutory provisions allows for
civil commitment prior to trial or in anticipation of release from incarceration. 81 The United States Code requires commitment until the accused is
mentally competent to stand trial.8 2 Commitment before release after incarceration requires a clear showing that the prisoner is dangerous.8 3 In addition, in Greenwood v. United States,8 4 the Supreme Court approved
application of the dangerousness test to a pretrial detainee, allowing his release only when he no longer was dangerous. 85 The Court held that commitment upon a finding that release would "endanger the officers, property, or
other interests of the United States ' 8 6 was "auxiliary to incontestable national power ' ' and thus clearly within
congressional authority granted by
8
the necessary and proper clause.1
Greenwood did not specifically address how long detention may last where
a straightforward application of the federal commitment procedures results
in a virtual life sentence for a defendant with a poor mental prognosis. 89 The
potential for interminable commitment did arise some fourteen years later
when the Supreme Court considered a similar Indiana commitment proce78. Id. at 429-30. In addition to the difficulty in attempting to apply psychiatric testimony to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the Addington Court maintained that civil
commitment is not punitive and placed such cases on the regulatory side of the punitive/
regulatory dichotomy. Id. at 428.
79. Addington, 441 U.S. at 429-30.
80. Id. at 430.
81. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-4248 (1982). Sections 4244 and 4245 describe court procedures for
ascertaining mental incompetency of defendants at the time of trial. Id. §§ 4244-4245. Section
4246 empowers the court to commit those persons found mentally incompetent under §§ 4244
and 4245 to the custody of the Attorney General until the accused become competent. Id.
§ 4246. Section 4246 also provides that where, under § 4247, such individuals are prisoners
about to be released upon expiration of their prison sentence, § 4248 shall apply to require
commitment until they become sane or cease to be dangers to "the officers, the property, or
other interests of the United States." Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 367-69
(1956); 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
83. Id. §§ 4247-4248.
84. 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
85. Id. at 374.
86. Id. at 375.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 375-76.
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dure in Jackson v. Indiana.9 ° In Jackson, the Supreme Court sought an
outer boundary to commitment for lack of competency to stand trial where
the effect was virtually permanent.9 1 The Court adopted the "rule of reasonableness" that had percolated in the lower courts since Greenwood's adoption.92 The rule, created to meet the guarantees of due process, requires
holding of the defendant only for a reasonable time before continued incompetency required release or a more stringent commitment procedure.9" The
operation of the rule, however, specifically excluded defendants found "dangerous" under the Indiana statute.94
B.

PretrialDetention: 1984 Bail Reform Act Withstands Facial Challenge

1. Requirements of the Bail Reform Act
Bail reform refocused the search for a definition of "dangerous behavior."9 5 By the time Congress considered the Bail Reform Act, it was evident
that, out of the range of circumstances where dangerous behavior results in
preventive detention, a few ground rules must be followed.96 First, as Jackson demonstrates, deprivation of liberty is not in violation of substantive due
process where a showing of dangerous behavior exists.97 Second, to survive
a federalism challenge, the guidelines for detention must be "necessary and
proper" to some specific federal authority.98 Third, as Stack explains, the
bail clause treats those detention proceedings that are penal in nature as
90. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
91. The petitioner in Jackson was a mentally defective deaf mute with virtually no communication skills. Id. at 717. Because Indiana's standard for competency required commitment of the defendant until such time as he was ufientally and physically capable of
understanding the proceedings and assisting in his defense, the commitment had the effect of a
life sentence. Id. at 718-19.
92. Id. at 732-34.
93. Id. at 734. In addition to his due process challenge, the petitioner in Jackson successfully charged that alternative commitment proceedings available to feeble-minded persons providing a more stringent standard of proof and a more relaxed release requirement violated his
rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 723-30.
94. Id. at 733.
95. Unlike the alien status of foreign nationals detained prior to deportation proceedings
or the parens patriae rationale which distinguishes detention of juveniles and the mentally ill,
the Bail Reform Act involves incapacitation of dangerous, but mentally competent adults
charged with serious crimes, a distinction which brings the punitive/regulatory distinction into
sharp focus. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1986)
(eight persons alleged to be members of the "Los Macheteros" terrorist organization arrested
on armed robbery charges and detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)).
96. See United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2102 (1987) (courts have repeatedly
upheld the regulatory interest of government in community safety at the expense of personal
liberty in a variety of circumstances).
97. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 218 (1986).
98. Id. at 110 (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956)).
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unconstitutional "punishment" without bail or trial. 99 Civil proceedings, on
the other hand, escape such constitutional infirmity,' °° especially where a
suitable standard of proof, such as the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of Addington, applies.'
As codified, the Bail Reform Act establishes a threat-to-community standard for detention.1" 2 Sections 3124(e) and (f) determine the existence of
such a threat through application of detailed guidelines which may give rise
to a rebuttable presumption that the accused is dangerous. The presumption
arises upon two separate findings by the court.'0 3 First, if the court determines at a detention hearing that there is probable cause to believe the accused has committed any one of several specified felonies," °4 a rebuttable
presumption exists that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure.., the safety of the community."' ' Second, the same rebuttable presumption will arise upon a motion by the government's attorney in
a case charging the accused with certain specified crimes,'0 6 where the court
99. 342 U.S. 1,4-6 (1951) (bail denied defendants accused of a noncapital offense hampers
preparation of defense and results in "infliction of punishment prior to conviction"); cf Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104 (rejecting proposition that Stack "categorically prohibits" regulation
of pretrial release where other "compelling interests" are involved).
100. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
101. Id. at 433.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1982) (originally enacted as the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, title II, 98 Stat. 1976). Section 3142 provides in pertinent part:
[1If, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer
finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial.
Id. § 3142(e).
103. Id. § 3142 (e) - (f).
104. The statute requires that the judicial officer first find:
[T]hat there is probable cause to believe that the person committed an offense for
which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the
Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled Sustances Import and Export Act, section
1 of the Act of September 15, 1980, or an offense under section 924(c) of title 18 of
the United States Code.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. The statute requires a case involving:
(A) a crime of violence;
(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death;
(C) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act, or section 1 of the Act of September 15, 1980; or
(D) any felony committed after the person had been convicted of two or more
prior offenses described in subparagraphs (A) through (C), or two or more State or
local offenses that would have been offenses described in subparagraphs (A) through
(C) if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed ....
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finds at a detention hearing that he has a prior conviction for one of those
crimes, and he committed it while on release pending trial.1" 7
The accused, once afforded counsel,10 isgiven the opportunity to rebut
the presumption through testimony, presentation of witnesses, cross-examination, and proffer of information.10 9 The judicial officer must consider: (1)
the nature of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime
involving a narcotic drug; (2) the weight of the evidence presented; (3) the
personal characteristics of the accused, including, inter alia, his physical and
mental condition, past conduct, and ties to the community; and (4) the seriousness of the danger such person would pose if released. "o If, after balancing all the factors, the court issues written findings1 1 that the accused, "by
clear and convincing evidence,"' 2 has been shown to pose a threat to the
safety of the community, the court orders his detention until trial. 113 1 The
14
detainee may, however, make expedited appeal of the detention order.
2. United States v. Salerno
In United States v. Salerno,1 ' the Supreme Court upheld the pretrial detention of two alleged organized crime figures on the grounds that the Bail
Reform Act satisfies the bail and due process clauses of the fifth, eighth, and
Id.§ 3142(f) (citations omitted).
107. The statute requires the judicial officer to find that:
(1) the person has been convicted of a Federal offense that is described in subsection (f)(1), or of a State or local offense that would have been an offense described in
subsection (f)(1) if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed;
(2) the offense in paragraph (1) was committed while the person was on release
pending trial for a Federal, State, or local offense; and
(3) a period of not more than five years has elapsed since the date of conviction, or
the release of the person from imprisonment, for the offense described in paragraph
(1), whichever is later.
Id. § 3142(e).
108. Id.§ 3142(f).
109. Id.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Judicial consideration of the accused's physical condition and
past history of drug abuse in determining whether to detain on community safety grounds
could conceivably result in the preventive detention of persons infected with the Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), known to plague intravenous drug users among others.
At least one Reagan administration official has suggested that AIDS-carrying prisoners, once
convicted, should be isolated and those who threaten to willfully spread the infection should be
detained indefinitely. Bennett's Far-FlungOpinions Make Him Subject of Debate, Wash. Post,
Aug. 3, 1987, at A6, col. 3.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).
112. Id.§ 3142(f).
113. Id.§ 3142(a)(4).
114. Id.§ 3145(b).
115. 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987).
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fourteenth amendments. " 6 During evidentiary proceedings, the district
court ordered detention of the respondents, alleged leaders of the Genovese
crime family of La Cosa Nostra, following the proffer of government surveillance evidence" 7 indicating that both men participated in conspiracies to
protect the organization's activities in illegal gambling, loansharking, and
the control of labor unions." 8 The government also asserted the willingness
of two witnesses to expose respondents' plans to commit further violence by
murdering two targeted individuals." 9 The court detained both respondents
under the Bail Reform Act,' 20 whereupon the respondents appealed,' 2 ' contending that their restraint imposed unconstitutional punishment prior to
trial.' 22 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
the decision, finding merit in their constitutional attack. 23 On petition by
the government, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, 24 finding
the Bail Reform Act to be facially valid.' 25
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist disclaimed
any express congressional intent to punish dangerous defendants in contravention of the due process protections of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 126 Nor, by application of the test set forth in the majority opinion,
116. Id. at 2098-100.
117. United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1366, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The indictment charged that defendant Anthony Salerno was the "Boss" of the Genovese family and that
Vincent Cafaro was a "Capo," or Captain, of the organization. Id. at 1366.
118. Id. at 1366-67 (the government arrested the defendants, along with 13 others, and in
an 88-page indictment charged them with mail and wire fraud, extortion, gambling, conspiracy
to murder, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)).
119. Id. at 1367-68 (James "Jimmy the Weasel" Fratianno and Angelo Lonardo, two formerly active members of La Cosa Nostra, agreed to testify concerning orders by the defendant
Salerno and others to "contract" for the murders of two named individuals).
120. Id. at 1375.
121. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 71-75.
123. Id. at 74-75.
124. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2098 (1987) (in a six-to-three decision). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying on its decision in United States
v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986), held in Salerno that insofar as the Bail
Reform Act mandates pretrial detention on danger-to-the-community grounds as a means of
preventing future crime, it violates due process. The circuit court specifically recognized as
valid, however, detention orders based solely on the risk that the defendant would flee the
jurisdiction. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 71-72. The Supreme Court's reversal of the Second Circuit
in Salerno does not disturb the validity of pretrial detention based on risk of flight. 107 S.Ct.
at 2104-05.
125. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2105.
126. Id. at 2101 (stating that the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act "clearly indicates" that Congress did not enact a pretrial detention provision to punish dangerous persons);
see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3190.
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was there any excessive "alternative purpose" to which the detention statute
rationally could be assigned."
Relying on the congressional intent to create a pretrial detention statute that relieved a "pressing societal problem," 12 the majority concluded that the Bail Reform Act is "regulatory"
and not "punitive" in nature.' 29 Even though Congress codified the preventive detention provision in the title of the United States Code pertaining to
crimes, 130 this regulatory interpretation is consistent with past observations
that preventive detention is distinctly civil and not criminal.' 3' The Chief
Justice wrote that Congress may subordinate the due process rights of pretrial detainees in "precisely" the same manner as in those instances where
the government, through civil actions, has established a compelling need to
detain dangerous aliens, juveniles, and the mentally unstable. 132 The government's "legitimate and compelling" interest in deterring crime, 1 33 combined with the various "special circumstances" in the past that have
warranted detention before trial, 3 4 combine to support the Court's conclusion that the Bail Reform Act does not violate substantive due process. 135
Salerno dispensed with the facial challenge to procedural due process by
holding that the Bail Reform Act satisfies the standard the Court established
in Schall v. Martin 136 for detention of juveniles. Where a statutory procedure for detention is " 'adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at
least some [persons] charged with crimes,' ,137 it is facially valid "whether
or not [it] might be insufficient in some particular circumstances. ' 138 In so
stating, the Court maintained, as it did in Jurek v. Texas, 131 that " 'there is
nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal
conduct.' "4
The majority rejected the respondents' reliance on Stack as support for a
127. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)).
128. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3186.
129. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
130. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 109 (3d Cir. 1986).
131. See supra notes 28, 29, 40 and accompanying text.
132. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2102.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2104.
136. 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (upholding New York statute permitting preventive detention of accused juvenile delinquents on findings that, if released, they would likely commit acts
which would be criminal if committed by an adult).
137. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 264).
138. Id.
139. 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (predicting dangerous behavior, although difficult, is an essential element of the criminal justice system).
140. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 278).
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finding that the Bail Reform Act violated the "excessive" bail restriction in
the eighth amendment.141 Quoting the Court's decision in Carlson, the majority followed the narrow view that the bail clause, with minor changes, is
the progeny of the English Bill of Rights which does not accord an unconditional right to bail. 14 2 The Court refused to resolve countervailing arguments that bail limitations apply to Congress, holding only that they apply
to the judiciary.' 43
The dissent by Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, disputes the
majority's conclusion that preventive detention is not a punitive, and
44
By analogy,
thereby, excessive measure for ensuring community safety.
the dissent compared the ease of enforcing a regulatory preventive detention
statute to the "absurdity" of a hypothetical law which authorizes the regulaby Congress that
tory nighttime curfew of all jobless persons upon a finding
14 5
unemployed.
the
by
night
at
most crime is committed
Substantive due process should not depend on any such magical redefinition. 14 6 Noting that under the statute an indictment is necessary before detention may occur, the Court found that, in effect, the indictment becomes
evidence of dangerousness. 147 This can lead to an illogical result should a
person, detained as dangerous following indictment, be found not guilty. He
must be set free or the detention exacts punishment without evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt. 148
The ease with which courts can manipulate the bail process to serve purposes independent of, and in some cases, contrary to, the issue of the individual's danger to the community is illustrated by the dissent's reference to the
facts of the case at bar. 149 Prior to his pretrial detention on grounds of dangerousness, the government had consented to Salerno's release from an ear5°
The release,
lier conviction sentencing him to 100 years incarceration.'
subject to federal bail laws, required "clear and convincing" proof that Salerno was not a threat to the community, raising the inference that government prosecutors were intent on using the respondent as a test case before
141. Id. at 2104; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
142. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2105 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952)).
143. Id. But see id. at 2108-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (incorporating by reference previously settled decisions by the Court that the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel
and unusual punishments" applies equally to both Congress and the Judiciary thereby inferring equal application of the bail clause).
144. Id. at 2107-08.
145. Id. (illustrating the majority's "cramped concept of substantive due process").
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2110.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2106-07.
150. Id. at 2106 n.l.
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the Court. 5 ' In the case of respondent Cafaro, the government consented to
his release ostensibly for health reasons, but in reality to permit him to serve
as a government informant. 152 Justice Marshall stated that "[t]here could be
no more eloquent demonstration of the coercive power of authority to imprison upon prediction, or of dangers which the almost inevitable abuses
pose to the cherished liberties of a free society."' 153 The real essence of preventive detention, in the dissent's view, lies in the Bail Reform Act's statutory disclaimer that " '[n]othing in this section shall be construed as
modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.' ,151
Justice Stevens, writing alone, dissented from the majority's conclusion
that preventive detention on the ground of an individual's danger to the
community is constitutional, but reserved judgment for instances where certain violence or times of crises may warrant brief detention. 15 5 Sharing in
Justice Marshall's reproach of the use of indictment as evidence of dangerindictment should carry no weight in determining
ousness, he asserted that
156
detention.
for
the need
The Salerno decision adds to an established body of law supporting preventive detention prior to trial. 157 Under subsection 3141(e), a valid predic158
tion of dangerous behavior warrants pretrial detention, as in Jackson,
without violating substantive due process guarantees. 159 Moreover, the Bail
Reform Act withstands the federalism challenge because detention is "necessary and proper" to the specific power of Congress to enact and enforce laws
151. Id. Release from conviction pending appeal requires "clear and convincing evidence
that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985); see also Salerno, 107 S.
community if released ....
Ct. at 2112 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the government's interest in litigating a
"test case" rather than a live "controversy" as required by article III of the United States
Constitution casts doubt on the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision on petition).
152. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2106-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2111.
154. Id. at 2109 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 31420) (Supp. III 1985)).
155. Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 2102.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
159. The possibility that substantive due process violations may occur if the detention is
excessive was expressly excluded from the Court's consideration in Salerno. 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
Unlike the "rule of reasonableness" established in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732-34
(1972), the outer limits of detention under the Bail Reform Act are governed by the Speedy
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), limiting to 90 days the pretrial
detention of persons designated as being of high risk. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b); see also Jackson,
406 U.S. at 732-34; cf United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 996 (2d Cir. 1986)
(referring to the Senate debate about inserting an absolute 90-day limit to pretrial detention
into the Bail Reform Act).
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governing serious criminal offenses.16" Finally, a criminal pretrial detention
statute avoids, through the Court's acceptance of the "regulatory" label, the
heavier procedural protections where punishment results.161
C. Post-Conviction Detention: Threat-to-Community Standard Found
Valid for Federal Courts
1.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 23

In contrast to the rich background of pretrial preventive detention, very
little interpretation has accompanied federal post-conviction authority to
stay release of successful habeas corpus petitioners on the ground that they
are dangerous to the community.1 62 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
23 governs the stay of habeas release. 163 Section (c) of Rule 23 presumptively favors release, unless the court shall "otherwise order."' 16 1 Section (d)
of Rule 23 instructs appellate courts to respect an initial custody or enlargement order unless modification or a new order is warranted for "special reasons shown."'165 Typically, a district court will allow a two- to three-month
period before letting the writ issue in order to allow the state time to retry
the defendant. 166 Aside from such common practices, however, little au160. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 111 (3d Cir.) (power of Congress to proscribe
the crimes specified in the Bail Reform Act gives rise to auxiliary authority to detain in order
to prevent their occurrence), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986).
161. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104 (procedural safeguards provided by the Bail Reform Act,
combined with the "legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose" it serves, meet procedural
due process requirements).
162. Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 994-95 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting, for example, that
"there is little explanation in the case law of what sort of 'special reason' must be demonstrated
to a reviewing court in making an order 'respecting custody, enlargement or surety [of a
habeas corpus petitioner]' ").
163. See infra notes 164-65. Authority of federal courts to release state prisoners is governed by federal habeas corpus statutes. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1982).
164. Section (c) of Rule 23 reads in full:
Release of Prisoner Pending Review of Decision Ordering Release. Pending review
of a decision ordering the release of a prisoner in such a proceeding, the prisoner
shall be enlarged upon the prisoner's recognizance, with or without surety, unless the
court or justice or judge rendering the decision, or the court of appeals or the
Supreme Court, or a judge or justice of either court shall otherwise order.
FED. R. APP. P. 23(c).
165. Section (d) of Rule 23 reads in full:
Modification of Initial Order Respecting Custody. An initial order respecting the
custody or enlargement of the prisoner and any recognizance or surety taken, shall
govern review in the court of appeals and in the Supreme Court unless for special
reasons shown to the court of appeals or to the Supreme Court, or to a judge or
justice of either court, the order shall be modified, or an independent order respecting
custody, enlargement or surety shall be made.
FED. R. App. P. 23(d).
166. Carter,781 F.2d at 994 n.1.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 38:271

thoritative precedent exists to interpret the rules. 167 Former Supreme Court
Rule 49, the precursor to rule 23(c), made release of prisoners prevailing on
the merits of a habeas petition mandatory.168 Courts, without further guidance, have relied on the ancestral development of rule 23(c) to heavily favor
69
release. 1
Deciding what "special reasons" may stay habeas relief has raised concerns for fundamental principles of comity and federal intrusion into matters
of traditional state concern.' 70 Beyond a federal court's responsibility to determine whether a constitutional infirmity at trial exists to warrant habeas
relief, the bounds of the federal courts' authority to tailor release seemed to
extend no further than ensuring that the petitioner did not flee federal jurisdiction. 17 ' Purely preventive detention in order to avoid harm to the community was considered to be outside the purview of federal court
72
authority.
2.

Hilton v. Braunskill

In Hilton v. Braunskill,7' 3 the Supreme Court extended federal court authority to stay release of prevailing habeas corpus petitioners solely on
threat-to-the-community grounds.' 74 In so doing, the Hilton majority expressly rejected the notion that principles of comity limited federal exercise

of stay authority. 75 Decided on the same day as Salerno, the Hilton decision, 176 relying on the broad discretion granted to federal courts to decide
habeas matters, 1 77 held that similarly broad discretion should govern the
167. United States ex rel. Taylor v. Redman, 500 F. Supp. 453, 459 (D. Del. 1980) (noting
the absence of case law to guide courts in determining what factors should govern decisions to
release individuals pending appeal); see also supra note 162.
168. Carter, 781 F.2d at 997.
169. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 742-43 (3d Cir.
1973).
170. Carter, 781 F.2d at 996 (treating "dangerousness" as a reason for detention as an
exclusively state concern unless it otherwise related to federal court functions). But see infra
note 175 and accompanying text.
171. Carter,781 F.2d at 995. Carterrecognized federal court authority to stay release of a
prevailing habeas petitioner if the state raised a valid concern that the petitioner, once enlarged, would flee federal jurisdiction. Id.; see also Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2118
(1987) (upholding federal stay authority to ensure later service of process).
172. Carter, 781 F.2d at 996.
173. 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 (1987), vacating, 629 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1986) (in a six-tothree decision).
174. Id. at 2120.
175. Id. at 2117-18 (overruling Carter, holding that exercise of federal stay powers on
grounds of dangerousness is not an intrusion on exclusive state authority).
176. Id. at 2113 (Hilton and Salerno were decided on May 26, 1987); United States v.
Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
177. 107 S. Ct. at 2118.
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stay of habeas relief.178 The Court considered this approach a practical extension of the accepted practice of delaying enlargement to allow the state
time to appeal the federal order. 179
The respondent in this case was convicted in New Jersey state court and
sentenced to nine and one half years in prison for sexual assault and unlawful possession of a knife.18 ° Contending that state court refusal to admit
testimony from an alibi witness violated his sixth amendment right to call
witnesses in his defense,18 1 respondent appealed, thereafter exhausting the
remedies available in state court. 182 The federal district court on petition
granted Braunskill a writ of habeas corpus, finding merit in his constitutional claim."8 3 State prosecutors, relying exclusively on the apparent danger Braunskill's release posed to the community, argued for a stay of the
order granting his release.' 8 4 The district court ruling, subsequently affirmed on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir85
cuit, held that stay of the writ could be granted only upon risk of flight.'
Relying on the Third Circuit decision in Carter v. Raffety, 86
' the district
court maintained that consideration of the accused's danger to the community as a factor determining the release of a state prisoner was not within the
187
purview of federal courts.
In vacating the district court order, 8 8 the Supreme Court determined that
the Carterdecision took too limited a view of rule 23, citing to federal court
ability to condition habeas relief "as law and justice require." ' 89 Against the
historical backdrop that once made release mandatory by creation of the
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Braunskill v. Hilton, 629 F. Supp. 511, 513 (D.N.J. 1986) vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2113
(1987). The court found that the defendant Braunskill, armed with a knife, sexually assaulted
a 69-year-old woman in the lobby of an apartment building. Id. The defendant, who was
arrested after the victim made a photographic identification, maintained that he was elsewhere
at the time the crime was committed. Id. at 514. A motion by defense counsel seeking introduction of alibi testimony was denied by the trial court upon the state's objection that the
motion was untimely. Id. at 513-16.
181. Id. at 517. The sixth amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the ight...
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
182. Hilton, 629 F. Supp. at 516-19.
183. Id. at 525-26.
184. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (1987).
185. Id.
186. 781 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1986) (stay of release denied in the case of Rubin "Hurricane"
Carter where the sole concern governing the state's application for a stay was the defendant's
dangerous sociopathic tendencies).
187. Hilton, 107 S.Ct. at 2117; see 781 F.2d at 997 (interpreting Rule 23(d) to be consistent
with federalism and comity concerns).
188. Hilton, 107 S.Ct. at 2120.
189. Id. at 2118 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982)).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 38:271

Supreme Court's own rules of procedure," 9° the majority emphasized that
federal courts even then retained discretion to condition release pending further state action.' 9 1 Consistent with this more permissive interpretation of
the modem rule 23, the majority commended its own practice of applying
traditional factors governing the stay of a civil judgment. 92 The presumptions created by rule 23 favoring the petitioner's release may be overcome by
information introduced by the state. 193 If, upon application by the state, the
court determines that the information brought forth convincingly demonstrates that the petitioner poses a threat to the community, enlargement will
be denied.' 9 4 The habeas petitioner's interest in release, always substantial
195
by the majority's view, will be greatest when the civil factors are weakest.
Conversely, a strong showing by the state that it can muster a sound case on
the merits will minimize the preference for release.' 96 Consideration of an
individual's danger to the community through the use of these civil factors is
not an intrusion on matters of traditional state concern, according to Justice
Rehnquist, who attributes whatever strain exists on federal-state relations to
federal habeas jurisdiction itself and not to federal discretion in exercising
197
that authority.
In support of its opinion that preventive detention is not repugnant to
substantive due process, the Hilton majority reiterated its holding in Salerno.198 Further, the majority stated, habeas petitioners, unlike the prearrest detainees in Salerno, are to be treated less favorably because habeas
petitioners, but for the constitutional infirmity at trial, have been found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'
In such cases, the due process provisions of the Constitution do not prohibit consideration of the threat the accused may pose to the community.2 °0
190. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
191. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2118 (construing issuance of conditional writs of habeas corpus as
consistent with Sup. CT. R. 34, predecessor to the present FED. R. App. P. 23).
192. Id. at 2118-19. The Hilton Court noted that four factors govern the stay of civil
judgments under federal rules applicable both to district courts and courts of appeals:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in
the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
Id. at 2119.
193. Id
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.at 2119-20.
197. Id. at 2120.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id

Preventive Detention

1988]

The dissent in Hilton found the majority's construction of rule 23 contrary
to the very principles of "law and justice" the majority sought to invoke on
behalf of its expanded view of habeas corpus jurisdiction.2 "1 According to
the dissent's view, acceptance of federal authority to make dangerous behavior a criteria for stay of habeas relief confuses the state's interest as an adversary in the litigation with the traditional respect afforded state decisions.2 "2
Moreover, the convention of conditioning writs of release on further action
by the state, rather than supporting federal court efforts to review the issue
of a habeas petitioner's violent propensities, more convincingly demonstrates
a healthy federal respect of state court authority to decide such matters.20 3
Taken from the reach of state laws, otherwise successful federal habeas
corpus petitioners may be detained as dangerous, like those detained prior to
trial under the Bail Reform Act, but in a manner which the dissent found to
be devoid of the same statutory safeguards afforded the defendants in Salerno.2 ' Adjudication of guilt, but for the constitutional failures at trial,
does not minimize the need for safeguarding erroneous deprivation of liberty
as the majority suggests.2 °5 Such a choice of logic "trivializes" the constitutional violation. 2 ' No grounds for continued punishment remain where the
decision to imprison an individual has been adjudged null and void.20 7

II.

REFINEMENTS TO PREVENTIVE DETENTION: TAKING THE
GUESSWORK OUT OF DECIDING WHO IS DANGEROUS

The Court's sine qua non treatment of guilt in Hilton casts post-conviction
detention in sharp contrast to the "numerous procedural safeguards" afforded the pretrial detainees in Salerno.2 "8 Under the Bail Reform Act, a
person is detained prior to trial only after failing, in a full adversarial hearing, to rebut a presumption of dangerousness created by satisfying a detailed
statutory standard of past behavior.2 0 9 In contrast, a petitioner who has
gained federal habeas release only after exhausting his state appeals, may be
denied the presumption of release by an unchallenged showing that he or she
is dangerous. 210 There is no required finding of past conduct evidencing
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 2124 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2121-22.
Id. at 2122.
See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.

205. See infra text accompanying notes 220-21.
206. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

207. Id.
208. 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2105 (1987); see also Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2112-23 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
209. See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 164-65, 192, and accompanying text.
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threatening behavior. 2 1' Nor is a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
demanded.2 12 Detention decisions in either case rest on common ground in
the respect that there exists a clear ability to try the defendant in the future.21 3 A state showing that it is able to successfully retry a habeas petitioner, however, standing alone, suffices to rebut the presumption of
release.21 4 Prosecution efforts to seek detention under the federal bail enactment face a tougher challenge.21 5
State comity considerations do not normally arise in the context of pretrial
preventive detention because the federal crimes which invite "regulatory"
treatment do not exist under habeas relief from state convictions. 21 6 Court

decisions prior to Hilton have recognized that the Bail Reform Act does not
apply to enlargement of habeas petitioners.21 7 There is concern, moreover,
with elimininating the confusing use of bail terms to describe surety requirements of conditional habeas writs.21 8 Courts previously have been led, nevertheless, to consider application of bail standards to cases involving habeas
corpus. 21 9 Those opposed to the idea point out that the federal authority to
deny bail is auxiliary to specified power to protect federal property and personnel. 220 This "necessary and proper" connection is absent where the individuals involved are in state, not federal, custody. 221 The Hilton majority
did not discuss what, if any, greater federal purpose authorizes denial of
habeas relief. The Court chose instead to describe the detention measure in
terms of a common sense extension of prior federal practice to briefly stay
211. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Hilton majority, emphasized the need to tailor stay
judgments to the circumstances of each case and the inability to reduce the general standards
for staying civil judgments to "a set of rigid rules." 107 S. Ct. at 2119; see also supra note 192
and accompanying text.

212. Hilton suggests only that the presumption favoring enlargement may be overcome if
the stay factors "tip the balance against it." 107 S. Ct at 2119.
213. See United States ex rel. Taylor v. Redman, 500 F. Supp. 453, 459 (D. Del. 1980)
(denying stay of habeas relief pending trial on other charges arising out of the same events on
ground that it violated the double jeopardy clause).
214. Walberg v. Israel, 776 F.2d 134, 136 (7th Cir. 1985) (showing that likelihood exists
that error at trial is curable is sufficient to rebut rule 23(c) presumption).
215. The adversarial hearing provided under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985) requires
only that the defendant meet the burden of producing evidence tending to show an absence of
dangerous behavior in the past; the burden of persuasion then rests with the United States to
show clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 107
n.4, 114-15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) requires a threshold determination of probable cause that the
accused committed a specified federal offense. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
217. United States ex rel. Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 741 (3d Cir. 1973).
218. Id.
219. Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 997 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986).
220. Id.; see also Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).
221. Carter, 781 F.2d at 997 n.5.
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enlargement pending retrial by the state.22 2
Despite the divergent procedural safeguards in both cases, preventive detention prior to trial and following conviction are pointedly characterized as
civil, not criminal proceedings. 22 3 Such a portrayal has been critical to the
maintenance of the wider body of commitment proceedings.22 4 Hilton relies
on the traditional civil label attached to habeas corpus.2 2 5 Salerno, by contrast, adopts civil overtones by reference to the regulatory imperative of
resolving the bail crisis and the lack of intent by Congress to treat detention
as punishment.2 26 Other "civil" detentions have addressed the dangerous
propensities of the mentally ill by reference to legitimate state interest under
parens patriae authority.2 27 Still other detention actions have avoided the
higher procedural requirements of criminal proceedings by treating them as
"necessarily" a part of settled federal authority to deport undesirable
aliens. 228 The civil distinction in each case makes it possible to detain without delay individuals who are clearly dangerous. 229 Thus, an insane
skyjacker may be detained where his release would almost certainly result in
further violence. 210 Or, a defendant in possession of a sawed-off shotgun
would be detained, rather than set free, after mailing a bomb to a police
station where he was formally charged.2 3'
The civil-criminal distinction has been described by one authority as a
"labeling game," the rules of the game requiring the "players"-the state on
the one hand and the "defendant, patient, juvenile ward, [or] deportee" on
the other-to convince the court that the proceedings should be either criminal or civil. 23 2 For support, the players might rely on the intent of statutory
enactment or, more simply, the location of the relevant laws outside the
222. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 (1987).
223. See supra notes 18, 28-29, 57, 192, and accompanying text.
224. Id.
225. 107 S. Ct. at 2118-19.
226. 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2098-99 (1987).
227. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); see also Shah, Some Interactionsof
Law and Mental Health in the Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 674, 675
(1974).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 230-31.
230. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2112 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1088 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
231. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 46, § 12.3, at 139 & n.63 (citing In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973)).
232. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1295-96 (1973) (Professor Dershowitz attributes use of the "civil"
label to avoidance by courts of responsibility for supervising procedural safeguards to predictive determinations of dangerous behavior.).
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criminal code.2 3 3 Such a labeling game distinction underlines the concern
for avoiding overzealous detention. The detainees in Carlson, for example,
included one homemaker and a waiter who sold some $50,000 in United
States war bonds, both labelled as dangerous to the country's safety and
welfare and detained under the "civil" authority of the Executive to deport
members of the communist movement.2 34
Whether the substantive criteria for civil detention results in preventing
obvious harm to the public or in overzealous protection, judicial ability to
predict dangerous behavior lies at the root of the issue.2 35 The ease with
which the Salerno majority glosses over concern for accurate prediction of
future criminal behavior is not supported by other authorities which gener2 36
ally discount a court's ability to make consistent psychiatric predictions.
Jurek v. Texas,2 37 the leading case supporting the ability of courts to predict
dangerousness, has received critical attention.2"' The Texas capital punishment procedure found constitutional in Jurek hinges on a jury's ability to
accurately respond to the "probability ' 239 that a defendant found guilty of
murder would pose a "continuing threat to society. "'2 The Jurek jury standard, criticized as "hopelessly vague,, 241 has been negatively compared to
24 2
the phrase "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions"
which the Supreme Court treated as unconstitutional, during the same term
3
as Jurek

24

Nonetheless, lay predictions of dangerous behavior have been considered
to be more competent than the results of legal pressure to force empirical
233. See id. at 1296-97.
234. 342 U.S. 524, 549-50 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
235. See Dershowitz, supra note 232, at 1288-93.
236. The Salerno opinion addressed the issue of judicial ability to predict dangerous behavior in a single statement. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 274 (1976)).
237. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
238. See, e.g., Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26
CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1976); see also Stone, The New Legal Standardof Dangerousness: Fairin
Theory, Unfair in Practice, in DANGEROUSNESS:
TRY AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 20-21 (1985).

PROBABILITY AND PREDICTION, PSYCHIA-

239. 428 U.S. at 269.
240. Under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Supp. 1975-1976), a death sentence
may be imposed if the jury responds affirmatively to three questions, the second of which
reads: "(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269. The
other two jury questions require consideration of nothing further than what already should
have been decided upon a finding of guilt by the jury prior to the sentencing procedure. See
Black, supra note 238, at 3-4.
241. See Black, supra note 238, at 5.
242. Id.(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 202 (1976)).
243. Id. (both cases were decided by the Supreme Court on July 2, 1976).

1988]

Preventive Detention

predictions of dangerousness out of the psychiatric profession. 2 " The reason given is that dangerous behavior is not as likely to be a "trait disorder"
as it is to be "situational and interactional. 2 41 Dangerous behavior, therefore, may be a rare event and hard to measure in terms of future predictability. 246 The violent rage of a person who is highly provoked is less
predictable than the frequent dangerous behavior of others under normal
conditions. 247 Consequently, a pattern of over-prediction of dangerous behavior has developed, even by clinicians not relying on empirical
predictors. 248 Research indicates that for every one person accurately found
to be dangerous and preventively detained, five to ninety-nine or more individuals are wrongfully detained by inaccurate predictions of dangerousness.24 9 While limitations on judicial resources may cause such results, the
evidence of abusive detention is factually inopposite to American notions
2 0
that innocence must be protected even at the expense of freeing the guilty.
III.

INNOCENCE PROTECTED: CLOSING THE DISTANCE BETWEEN
CIVIL ORDER AND PREDICTIVE ACCURACY

What follows from the Supreme Court's approval of preventive detention
in Salerno and Hilton is a construct of constitutional behavior which cuts a
rough distinction between the right to liberty of two classes of "dangerous"
persons.25 1 What remains, in either case, is a persistent doubt that the systems devised are detaining only the dangerous. 2 2 Yet, the design of preventive detention, as the long history of civil commitment shows, is clearly not3
25
to protect everyone from the hazards of erroneous restraint of liberty.
The premium is public safety.2 5 4 Preventive detention may afford a margin
of error as long as jailing the nondangerous is a by-product of meeting the
"sufficiently weighty" needs of protecting society. 2 5 This does not discount
244. See Stone, supra note 236, at 22.
245. Id. at 17.
246. Schwitzgebel, Legal and Social Aspects of the Concept of Dangerousness, in DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH 83, 87 (C. Frederick ed. 1979).
247. See id. at 87-88.
248. See Shah, supra note 227, at 705.
249. See id. at 706.
250. See Stone, supra note 238, at 18.
251. See United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987) (individuals charged with certain
federal crimes detained prior to trial upon finding of dangerousness); cf Hilton v. Braunskill,
107 S.Ct. 2113 (1987) (prisoners detained as dangerous by a stay of a writ of habeas corpus
granting their release).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 244-50.
253. See supra text accompanying note 249.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 126-35.
255. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2103.
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the possibility that a detention scheme may supply both constitutional validity and better predictive accuracy. Critical examination of preventive detention supports legislative efforts to clarify the legal definition of "dangerous"
behavior.25 6 The Bail Reform Act upheld in Salerno, by its very specific
2 7
terms, provides a solid example of such a definition. '
In contrast, Hilton's refusal to reduce procedures governing the stay of
habeas relief "to a set of rigid rules" 258 illustrates an interest in flexibility at
the possible expense of a clear definition. The likely result of more "overpredictions" in the case of habeas petitioners is saved only by the majority's
debatable logic that many habeas petitioners would still rightfully remain
lodged in prison "but for" the constitutional infirmity at their trial.259
Supreme Court acceptance of the two detention schemes, however, does
not erase the possibility for state action to improve the predictive accuracy of
preventive detention. 2 1 Pretrial detention may easily become retrial detention through careful modeling of state bail laws.26 1 Upon rearrest, a state
prisoner prevailing on the merits of a federal habeas petition may be detained, but this time by the state, following a well-defined detention procedure.2 62 At present, twenty-three states have pretrial detention statutes.2 6 a
It has been noted, however, that most of them allow for detention only when
the crime committed occurred when the accused was out on bail. 264 State
enactment of pretrial detention laws modeled after the Bail Reform Act
would result in detention where the person has been accused of a specific
crime and has a past recorded incidence of criminal activity following release
from incarceration.26 5
States, unlike the federal government, are not governments of limited
powers and have the additional power to legislate for the "general welfare"
beyond the reach of their spending authority.2 66 The result of not having to
legislate detention as "necessary and proper" to some specific grant of power
could actually produce more refined means for predicting dangerous behav256. See Schwitzgebel, supra note 246, at 92.
257. See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
258. 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200, 205-07.
260. The National Association of Attorneys General suggests that the Salerno decision will
induce state legislatures to model their detention statutes after the Bail Reform Act. Stewart,
PretrialDetentions Upheld, 73 A.B.A. J.54, 58 (Aug.1987).
261. See id.
262. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2121-22 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
263. See Stewart, supra note 260, at 58.

264. Id.
265. See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
266. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 218 (1986).
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ior. 267

Federal judges, once satisfied that there is a suitable state alternative
to a stay of federal habeas corpus authority, may exercise their "broad discretion" in such matters and release the petitioner to state authorities for
subsequent state proceedings.26 8 Such a result avoids the state comity issue
altogether.26 9 While Hilton holds that stays of habeas relief are not an inappropriate federal intrusion on state matters, the decision does not mandate
full exercise of federal court authority to prevent state action.27 ° Ironically,
the respondent in Hilton would be a free man in the absence of federal intercession because New Jersey, the state which convicted him, does not provide for preventive pretrial detention. 27 1
Future efforts to fine tune preventive detention may be enhanced by
tougher state measures requiring jail sentences rather than giving straight
probation. One recent study shows that twenty-six percent of persons convicted of major felonies were released without serving time in jail.27 2 For
drug traffickers, one of the criminal target areas of the federal bail enactment, 273 more than half of those convicted in state courts received probation, nearly half of those probated never served a day in prison for their
crimes. 274 Prison overcrowding has been held partly to blame. 275 The rate
of violent crime, however, is reported to be on the decline, a trend attributed
to the aging of the baby boom generation.2 76 To fill the void, determinant
jail sentencing procedures, which place greater emphasis on incarceration
for convictions,27 7 may alleviate the burden recidivism places on deciding
267. Because states have more latitude to legislate for the general welfare, state pretrial

detention statutes may be less constrained to consider indicators of dangerous behavior other
than indictment for specified offenses; at the same time, such ability may lead to abuses. See

Stewart, supra note 260, at 58 (suggesting that bail reform might be revisited by the Supreme
Court if abuses develop).
268. See supra text accompanying note 262.
269. See supra notes 170-71, 175, and accompanying text.
270. Hilton holds only that federal courts are not restrained by state comity concerns in
exercising their authority under rule 23(c) and (d) to stay habeas relief upon a showing of
dangerousness. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
271. See supra text accompanying note 262.
272. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NCJ105743 SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN 28 FELONY COURTS 1985 5 (July 1987) (the fact that jail

and not prison is the correctional institution selected for those felons actually incarcerated
becomes more significant in light of the fact that convicted felons are usually perceived as
state, not local, reponsibilities).
273. See supra note 104.
274. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 272, at 5.
275. See id. at 18.
276. Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1987, at A6, col. 1 (In 1986, 34.1 million crimes were estimated to
have occurred, a decline from 1985 of 750,000 and a drop of 7 million from 1981. The decline
is attributed to a reduction of persons in the crime prone 15 to 24 age bracket.).
277. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 272, at 18.
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which persons accused of crimes, but as yet untried, may be dangerous and
worthy of preventive pretrial detention.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Preventive detention gives rise to uncomfortable choices which must be
faced when deciding who must be detained to protect community safety.
Salerno and Hilton hold that community safety takes a "legitimate and compelling" place in the body of law restraining personal liberty for the greater
good. The result, almost by necessity, is that innocent people will be detained at the expense of attempts to cure a larger social evil. Future abuses
which may arise from the standards set forth under the Bail Reform Act
may cause the Supreme Court to reconsider the "necessity" of regulatory
intervention to allay society's discomfort with freeing potentially dangerous
individuals prior to trial. State legislatures, at the same time, undoubtedly
will be closely following the progress of federal bail reform with an eye toward revising their own bail enactments to more accurately predict and detain individuals who threaten their communities. Victorious federal habeas
corpus petitioners, as a result, may garner the benefits of state legislative
action. In the meantime, the likelihood remains that federal courts will be
motivated to stay the release of prisoners who prevail on their habeas appeal
upon a showing by the state as an adversary party that the prisoner is dangerous. The danger may, however, be nothing more than the state's inattention to the need for more care in constructing its own bail laws.
Available alternatives to preventive detention, such as determinant sentencing, show promise in minimizing reliance on the difficult nature of predicting "dangerous" behavior. Initiatives by state legislatures to mandate
determinant sentencing procedures will help minimize the number of highrisk individuals who may reenter the jailhouse door through a system of
prevention, perhaps only to be set back out on the street again.
John A. Washington

